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Introduction
There is an abundant literature on production function estimation studying how …rms convert inputs into outputs and the e¢ ciency with which this occurs (see Syverson, 2011 for a survey). This literature as of late has given increasing attention to possible biases that market imperfections -particularly in the product market-could induce in production function and productivity estimates. There is a long tradition in applied industrial organization of estimating product market power (see De Loecker and Warzynski, 2012 for references). While most economists believe that product and labor market imperfections almost surely exist to one degree or another, only few have explicitly accounted for their joint in ‡uence on production function estimation at the micro level (see Dobbelaere and Mairesse, 2013 for references). Contributing to the econometric literature on estimating micro-economic production functions and the one on estimating simultaneously market imperfections in product and labor markets, this paper serves the purpose of quantifying industry di¤erences in product and labor market imperfections and scale economies using …rm-level data in France, Japan and the Netherlands. Do manufacturing industries in the three countries under consideration belong to di¤erent regimes characterizing the type of competition prevailing in product and labor markets? To what extent do manufacturing industries within a particular regime di¤er in the degree of imperfections in the product and labor markets in which they operate? These are the main questions that we address.
In this paper, we rely on two extensions of Hall's (1988) econometric framework for estimating simultaneously price-cost margins and scale economies using …rm panel data that take into account imperfections in the labor market. Instead of imposing a particular labor market setting on the data -a common practice in empirical studies estimating labor market imperfections-we follow Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2013) and use econometric production functions as a tool for testing the competitiveness of product and labor markets and evaluating their degree of imperfection. We consider two product market settings (perfect competition (P C) and imperfect competition (IC)) and three labor market settings (perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining (P R), e¢ cient bargaining (EB) and monopsony (M O)). We thus distinguish 6 regimes.
Our empirical analysis is based on three large unbalanced panels of manufacturing …rms: 17,653 …rms over the period 1986-2001 in France, 8,725 …rms over the period 1994-2006 in Japan and 7,828 …rms over the period 1993-2008 in the Netherlands. It consists of two parts. In the …rst part, we apply two procedures to classify 30 comparable manufacturing industries in distinct regimes that di¤er in terms of the type of competition prevailing in product and labor markets in each country. The …rst classi…cation procedure is based on point estimates of our parameters of interest and enables a complete classi…cation whilst the second is based on con…dence intervals around estimated parameters which entails a more statistically correctbut incomplete-characterization of industries. We observe important di¤erences in the prevalent product and labor market settings, and hence in the prevalent regimes across the three countries. Irrespective of the classi…cation procedure, we …nd that (i) the proportion of industries (and …rms) that is characterized by imperfect competition in the product market is much higher in France and the Netherlands than in Japan and (ii) the most prevalent labor market setting is e¢ cient bargaining in France and perfect competition or rightto-manage bargaining in Japan and the Netherlands. As such, according to both classi…cation procedures, the dominant regime is one of imperfect competition in the product market and e¢ cient bargaining in the labor market in France, one of perfect competition in the product market and perfect competition or rightto-manage bargaining in the labor market in Japan and one of imperfect competition in the product market and perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining in the labor market in the Netherlands.
In the second part, we investigate industry di¤erences in the estimated product and labor market imperfection parameters within the three predominant regimes in each country. In addition to the important cross-country regime di¤erences that our analysis reveals, we also …nd di¤erences in the levels of market imperfections and scale economies within a regime.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical framework and elucidates the econometric implementation. Section 3 presents the …rm panel data for France, Japan and the Netherlands. Section 4 applies two classi…cation procedures to characterize the type of competition in the product and labor markets of our selected manufacturing industries. Section 5 analyses industry di¤erences in the degree of market imperfections within predominant regimes. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework and econometric implementation 2 
.1 Theoretical framework
This section extends the framework of Hall (1988) for estimating price-cost margins and scale economies. To this end, we follow Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2013) by considering three labor market settings: perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining (Nickell and Andrews, 1983) , e¢ cient bargaining (McDonald and Solow, 1981) and monopsony (Manning, 2003) . This section contains the main ingredients of the theoretical framework. For technical details, we refer to Appendix A.
We start from a production function Q it = it F (N it ; M it ; K it ), where i is a …rm index, t a time index, N is labor, M is material input and K is capital. it = Ae i +ut+ it , with i an unobserved …rm-speci…c e¤ect, u t a year-speci…c intercept and it a random component, is an index of technical change or "true" total factor productivity. Denoting the logarithm of Q it ; N it ; M it ; K it and it by q it ; n it ; m it ; k it and it respectively, the logarithmic speci…cation of the production function gives:
where (" Q J ) it (J = N; M; K) is the elasticity of output with respect to input factor J.
Firms operate under imperfect competition in the product market (IC). We allow for three labor market settings (LM S): perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining (P R) 1 , e¢ cient bargaining (EB) and monopsony (M O). We assume that material input and labor are variable factors. Short-run pro…t maximization implies the following …rst-order condition with respect to material input:
where ( M ) it = jitMit PitQit is the share of material costs in total revenue and it = Pit
refers to the mark-up of output price P it over marginal cost (C Q ) it . Depending on the prevalent LM S, short-run pro…t maximization implies the following …rst-order condition with respect to labor:
where ( N ) it = witNit PitQit is the share of labor costs in total revenue. it = it 1 it represents the relative extent of rent sharing, it 2 [0; 1] the absolute extent of rent sharing and (" N w ) it 2 < + the wage elasticity of the labor supply. From the …rst-order conditions with respect to material input and labor, it follows that the parameter of joint market imperfections ( it ):
= 0 if LM S = P R (7)
Assuming that the elasticity of scale, it = (" Q N ) it + (" Q M ) it + (" Q K ) it , is known, the capital elasticity can be expressed as:
Inserting Eqs. (2), (6) and (10) in Eq. (1) and rearranging terms gives:
Econometric implementation
Eq. (6) shows that the di¤erences between the estimated output elasticities of labor and materials and their revenue shares are key to empirical identi…cation of the product and labor market imperfection parameters.
Essential is that the test for the prevalent LM S assumes that …rms take the price of materials as given. In a perfectly competitive labor market or in a right-to-manage bargaining setting, the only source of discrepancy between the estimated output elasticity of labor and the share of labor costs in revenue is the …rm price-cost mark-up, just like in the materials market [Eq. (3)]. Therefore, the di¤erence in the two factors' outputelasticity-to-revenue-share ratios, i.e. the parameter of joint market imperfections, equals zero [Eq. (7) ].
In an e¢ cient bargaining setting, the marginal employee receives a wage that exceeds his/her marginal revenue since e¢ cient bargaining allocates inframarginal gains across employees. As such, the output-elasticity-torevenue-share ratio for labor becomes smaller, and smaller than the respective ratio for materials in particular. Hence, there is a positive di¤erence between the materials and labor ratios, i.e. the parameter of joint market imperfections is positive [Eq. (8) ].
In a monopsony setting, on the other hand, the marginal employee obtains a wage that is less than his/her marginal revenue. As such, the output-elasticity-to-revenue-share ratio for labor exceeds the respective ratio for materials, yielding the negative parameter of joint market imperfections [Eq. (9) ].
Depending on the LM S, it follows from the parameter of joint market imperfections that the di¤erences between the estimated output elasticities of labor and materials and their revenue shares can be mapped into either the …rm price-cost mark-up and the extent of rent sharing [Eq. (8)] or the …rm price-cost mark-up and the …rm labor supply elasticity [Eq. (9) ].
Since our study aims at (i) comparing regime di¤erences in terms of the type of competition prevailing in product and labor markets across France, Japan and the Netherlands and (ii) assessing within-regime industry di¤erences in the estimated product and labor market imperfection parameters and the scale elasticity parameters in each of the countries, we estimate average parameters. There are many sources of variation in input shares. Some of them are related to variation in machinery and capacity utilization, i.e. variation in the business cycle. When deriving our parameters of interest, we want to abstract from such sources of variation. Therefore, we assume average input shares. The empirical speci…cation that acts as the bedrock for the regressions at the industry level is hence given by:
The estimated industry-speci…c joint market imperfections parameter b j determines the regime characterizing the type of competition prevailing in the product and the labor market. A priori, 6 distinct regimes are possible: (1 ) perfect competition in the product market and perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining in the labor market, (2 ) imperfect competition in the product market and perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining in the labor market, (3 ) perfect competition in the product market and e¢ cient bargaining in the labor market, (4 ) imperfect competition in the product market and e¢ cient bargaining in the labor market, (5 ) perfect competition in the product market and monopsony in the labor market and (6 ) imperfect competition in the product market and monopsony in the labor market. We denote the 6 possible regimes by R 2 < = fP C-P R; IC-P R; P C-EB; IC-EB; P C-M O; IC-M Og, where the …rst part re ‡ects the type of competition in the product market and the second part re ‡ects the type of competition in the labor market. Once the regime is determined, we derive the product and labor market imperfection parameters from the estimated joint market imperfections parameter.
Data description
The French data are based on …rm accounting information from EAE ("Enquête Annuelle d'Entreprise", "Service des Etudes et Statistiques Industrielles" (SESSI)). The Japanese data are sourced from the con-…dential micro database of the "Kigyou Katsudou Kihon Chousa Houkokusho" (Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities (BSJBSA)) collected annually by the Research and Statistics Department (METI). 2 The survey is compulsory for …rms with more than 50 employees and with capital of more than 30 million yen. The Dutch data are sourced from the Production Surveys (PS) at Statistics Netherlands which are collected annually by the "Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek" (CBS). A combination of census and strati…ed random sampling is used for each wave of the PS. A census is used for the population of enterprises with at least …fty employees and a strati…ed random sampling is used for enterprises with fewer than …fty employees. The stratum variables are the economic activity and the number of employees of an enterprise. For each country, our estimation sample is restricted to …rms having at least four consecutive observations. After some trimming on input shares in total revenue and input growth rates to eliminate outliers and anomalies, we end up with an unbalanced panel of 17,653 …rms covering the period 1986-2001 in France (F R), 8,725 …rms spanning the period 1994-2006 in Japan (JP ) and 7,828 …rms over the period 1993-2008 in the Netherlands (N L). Output (Q) is de…ned as current production de ‡ated by the two-digit producer price index in F R and real gross output measured by nominal sales divided by the industry-level gross output price index in JP and 2 For details on the Japanese data, we refer to Kiyota et al. (2009) . 5 N L. Labor (N ) refers to the average number of employees in F R, the number of man-hours computed as each …rm's total number of employees multiplied by industry-level working hours in JP and the number of employees in September of a given year in N L. Material input is de…ned as intermediate consumption de ‡ated by the industry-level intermediate consumption price index in the three countries. The capital stock (K) is measured by the gross bookvalue of …xed assets in F R, computed from tangible assets and investment based on the perpetual inventory method in JP 3 and proxied by depreciation of …xed assets de ‡ated by the industry-level gross …xed capital formation price index for all assets in N L. The working hours and price de ‡ators for JP are obtained from the Japan Industrial Productivity (JIP) 2009 database, which was compiled by RIETI and Hitotsubashi University. 4 The price de ‡ators for N L are obtained from the EUKLEMS database (November 2009 release, March 2011 update). The shares of labor ( N ) and material input ( M ) are constructed by dividing respectively the …rm total labor cost and unde ‡ated intermediate consumption by the …rm unde ‡ated production and by taking the average of these ratios over adjacent years. Table 1 reports the means, standard deviations and quartile values of our main variables by country. The average growth rate of real …rm output is 3.3% per year in F R, 2.0% in JP and 2.5% in N L. In F R, labor, materials and capital have increased at an average annual growth rate of 1.4%, 4.9% and 0.8% respectively. In JP , labor and capital have decreased at an average annual growth rate of 0.2% and 0.3% respectively, while materials has increased at an average annual growth rate of 1.3%. In N L, labor, materials and capital have increased at an average annual growth rate of 0.4%, 2.6% and 1.6% respectively. The Solow residual or the conventional measure of total factor productivity (T F P ) is stable over the considered period in each country. As expected for …rm-level data, the dispersion of all these variables is considerably large. For example, T F P growth is lower than -5.2% (-2.2%) [-4 .3% ] for the …rst quartile of …rms and higher than 5.9% <Insert Table 1 
about here>
For illustrative purposes, we estimate Eq. (11) at the manufacturing level using the GMM estimator. 5 Table  B .2 in Appendix B present the results. From the estimated market imperfections parameter b , we infer that the IC-EB-regime applies at the manufacturing level in F R and N L and the P C-P R-regime in JP . 6 In F R (N L), the price-cost mark-up is estimated at 1.252 (1.429) and the absolute extent of rent sharing at 0.324 (0.245). In JP , the price-cost mark-up is estimated at 0.989.
Classi…cation of industries
In each country, we consider 30 comparable manufacturing industries, making up our estimation sample. This decomposition is detailed enough for our purpose and ensures that each industry contains a su¢ cient number of observations (minimum: 342 observations). Table B .3 in Appendix B presents the industry repartition of the estimation sample and the number of …rms and the number of observations by industry and country.
From Section 2, it follows that the industry-speci…c joint market imperfections parameter captures (im)perfect competition in both the product and the labor market and as such determines the prevalent regime to which each industry belongs. For each industry j 2 f1; : : : ; 30g, we estimate a standard Cobb-Douglas production function [Eq. (12)] using the system GMM estimator. We apply two classi…cation procedures. 1) Classi…cation procedure 1, on which we comment below, is summarized as follows: 
Classi…cation 1 is entirely based on the point estimates of the price-cost mark-up j and the joint market imperfections parameter j . On pragmatic grounds, we argue that de…ning H 0 : j 1 = j = 0 is too excessive. Based on the industry-speci…c input shares ( J ) j (J = N; M; K) and the industry-speci…c output elasticities b " Q J j (J = N; M; K) of the three countries, we select a common threshold of 1:10 for j and j0:30j
for j . 7 For example, if our null hypothesis is that imperfect competition in the product market and e¢ cient 7 bargaining in the labor market feature the industry, we perform the following test: H 10 : j 1 > 0:10 and H 20 : j > 0:30. The test rejects that the IC-EB-regime applies if either H 10 or H 20 is rejected. By construction, this procedure does not take into account the precision of the estimates but has the advantage of entailing a complete classi…cation. Table 2 summarizes the resulting industry classi…cation. Columns 3-5 in Table B .5 in Appendix B provide details on the speci…c industries belonging to each regime according to classi…cation 1. Focusing on the product market side, more than 83% of the industries comprising more than 91% of the …rms are typi…ed by imperfect competition in F R and N L whilst this does only hold for 43% of the industries comprising 39% of the …rms in JP . On the labor market side, 30% of the industries comprising 55% of the …rms are characterized by e¢ cient bargaining, 63% of the industries comprising 43% of the …rms by perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining and monopsony features only 7% of the industries comprising 2% of the …rms in F R. In JP , 53% of the industries comprising 51% of the …rms are characterized by perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining, 23% of the industries comprising 30% of the …rms by monopsony and 23% of the industries comprising 20% of the …rms by e¢ cient bargaining. In N L, the three labor market settings are more evenly distributed compared to F R and JP : 40% of the industries comprising 55% of the …rms are characterized by perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining, 30% of the industries comprising 25% of the …rms by monopsony and 30% of the industries comprising 20% of the …rms by e¢ cient bargaining. <Insert 
Classi…cation procedure 2 is based on con…dence intervals around estimated parameters. To determine the relevant product/labor market setting, we consider two a priori null hypotheses. Focusing on the product market side, choosing IC as the null hypothesis can be interpreted as believing more strongly in (some degree of) imperfect competition, whilst the opposite is true when choosing P C as the null hypothesis. The choice of two a priori null hypotheses allows the characterization of three types of industries. In particular, industry j is characterized to be highly imperfectly competitive or far from perfectly competitive, denoted by IC , if P M S = IC under both null hypotheses.
is characterized to be weakly imperfectly competitive or nearly perfectly competitive, denoted by P C , if P M S = P C under both null hypotheses.
belongs to the overlapping category, denoted by mover, if the P M S-type is di¤erent under both null hypotheses.
Focusing on the labor market side, choosing EB=M O as the null hypothesis can be interpreted as believing more strongly that the marginal employee receives a wage that di¤ers from his/her marginal revenue, whilst choosing P R as the null hypothesis supports more the belief that the marginal employee receives a wage equal to his/her marginal revenue. The choice of two a priori null hypotheses allows the characterization of four types of industries. In particular, industry j is most likely to be characterized by e¢ cient bargaining, denoted by EB , if LM S = EB under both null hypotheses. is most likely to be characterized by perfect competition/right-to-manage bargaining, denoted by P R , if LM S = P R under both null hypotheses.
belongs to the overlapping category, denoted by mover, if the LM S-type is di¤erent under both null hypotheses. Table 3a reports the three types of industries on the product market side and the four types of industries on the labor market side. Table 3b summarizes the resulting -incomplete-industry classi…cation. Table B .5 in Appendix B provides details on (i) the characterization of the speci…c industries (columns 6-8 on the product market side, columns 9-11 on the labor market side) and (ii) the speci…c industries belonging to a particular regime (columns [12] [13] [14] .
Let us …rst focus the discussion on the product market side. A large proportion of industries is characterized to be highly imperfectly competitive in F R and N L: 63% of the industries comprising 83% of the …rms in the former and 83% of the industries comprising 90% of the …rms in the latter. In contrast, 33% of the industries comprising 37% of the …rms are typi…ed to be nearly perfectly competitive in JP . In N L (F R), only 13% (7%) of the industries making up 9% (13) of the …rms are typi…ed as movers whereas 43% of the industries comprising 38% of the …rms belong to the overlapping category in JP .
On the labor market side, about 50% of the industries making up about 50% of the …rms are typi…ed as movers in the three countries. In F R, 23% of the industries comprising 41% of the …rms are most likely to be characterized by e¢ cient bargaining whereas the remaining 30% of industries comprising 10% of the …rms are most likely to be characterized by perfect competition/right-to-manage bargaining. In N L and JP , about 40% of the industries making up more than 42% of the …rms are typi…ed as P R -industries whereas only a small proportion -7% (10%) of the industries comprising 4% (6%) of the …rms in JP (N L)-are characterized as EB -industries.
<Insert Table 3a about here> Whereas classi…cation procedure 2 provides a more statistically correct characterization of industries, it entails an incomplete classi…cation. From Table 3b , it follows that only about 40% of the industries comprising 40% of the …rms can be classi…ed in one of the six regimes in F R and N L whereas this is only true for 27% of the industries making up 28% of the …rms in JP . The dominant regime is <Insert Table 3b about here>
Summing up, we observe important di¤erences in the prevalent product and labor market settings, and hence in the prevalent regimes across the three countries. Irrespective of the classi…cation procedure, the proportion of industries (and …rms) that is characterized by imperfect competition in the product market is much higher in F R and N L than in JP . Irrespective of the classi…cation procedure, the most prevalent labor market setting is e¢ cient bargaining in F R and perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining in JP and N L.
As such, according to both classi…cation procedures, the dominant regime is one of imperfect competition in the product market and e¤cient bargaining in the labor market in F R, one of perfect competition in the product market and perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining in the labor market in JP and one of imperfect competition in the product market and perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining in the labor market in N L. 8 Does the …nding of important regime di¤erences across the three countries imply that manufacturing industries in the three countries di¤er considerably in the type of competition prevailing in product and labor markets? To answer that question, we compare the relevant regime of each industry j 2 f1; : : : ; 30g across the three countries. To ensure a complete classi…cation, we base the comparison on classi…cation procedure 1. From columns 3-5 in Table B .5 in Appendix B, it follows that ten industries are characterized by the same product market setting in each of the three countries. The livestock, seafood and ‡our products industry is characterized by perfect competition whereas industries manufacturing textiles, furniture, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, metals, special industrial machinery, electronic parts and components, other transport equipment and miscellaneous manufacturing products are characterized by imperfect competition. Three industries are typi…ed by the same labor market setting in each of the three countries. Industries manufacturing furniture and metals are characterized by perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining whilst the miscellaneous machinery industry is characterized by monopsony.
Within-regime industry di¤erences in parameters of interest
To what extent do manufacturing industries within a particular regime di¤er in the degree of imperfections in the product and labor markets in which they operate? To address that question, we condition our answer on classi…cation 1 and investigate industry di¤erences in the estimated industry-speci…c scale elasticity parameter b j , joint market imperfections parameter b j , and corresponding price-cost mark-up b j and absolute extent of rent-sharing b j or labor supply elasticity b " N w j parameters within each of the three predominant regimes in F R, JP and N L. Table 4 presents the industry mean and the industry quartile values of the system GMM results within the three predominant regimes in each country. The left part of Table 4 reports the estimated scale elasticity parameter, the middle part the estimated joint market imperfections parameter and the right part the relevant product and labor market imperfection parameters, i.e. the price-cost mark-up within P C-P R and IC-P R, the price-cost mark-up and the extent of rent sharing within IC-EB, and the price-cost mark-up and the labor supply elasticity within P C-M O and IC-M O. We also present the industry-speci…c pro…t ratio parameter, which can be expressed as the estimated industry-speci…c price-cost mark-up divided by the estimated industry-speci…c scale elasticity b b j
. This ratio shows that the source of pro…t lies either in imperfect competition or decreasing returns to scale. The standard errors
are computed using the Delta method (Wooldridge, 2002) . 9 All industry-speci…c estimates are presented in Table B .6 in Appendix B. 10 In addition to the parameters reported in Table 4 , Table B .6 also reports the computed factor shares and the output elasticity estimates. In Table B .6, industries within the P C-P R-and IC-P R-regimes are ranked according to b j . Within the P C-EB-and IC-EB-regimes, we rank industries in increasing order of b j . Within the P C-M O-and IC-M O-regimes, industries are ranked according to b j .
Let us focus the discussion on the primary parameters within the predominant regimes in F R, JP and N L respectively. The predominant regimes in F R are IC-EB (30% of industries/51% of …rms), IC-P R (40% of industries/38% of …rms) and IC-M O (13% of industries/5% of …rms).
Within regime R = IC-EB in F R, b j is lower than 0.937 for industries in the …rst quartile and higher than 0.971 for industries in the third quartile. b j is lower than 0.477 for industries in the …rst quartile and higher than 0.702 for industries in the third quartile. The corresponding b j is lower than 1.295 for the …rst quartile of industries and higher than 1.413 for the top quartile. The corresponding b j is lower than 0.376 for the …rst quartile of industries and higher than 0.460 for the top quartile. The median values of b j , b j b j and b j are estimated at 0.948, 0.518, 1.320 and 0.414 respectively.
Within regime R = IC-P R in F R, b j is lower than 0.998 for industries in the …rst quartile and higher than 1.017 for industries in the third quartile. b is lower than 1.215 for industries in the …rst quartile and higher than 1.305 for industries in the upper quartile. The median values of j and j are estimated at 1.005 and 1.248 respectively. Within regime R = P C-P R in JP , b j is lower than 1.021 for industries in the …rst quartile and higher than 1.068 for industries in the third quartile. b is lower than 1.011 for industries in the …rst quartile
Their respective standard errors are computed as: Table B .6 also provides detailed information on the system GMM estimates of the industries which are classi…ed in the non-predominant regimes in the three countries, i.e. the P C-P R-and P C-M O-regimes in F R, the P C-EB-, IC-EB-and IC-M O-regimes in JP and the P C-M O-and P C-P R-regimes in N L. and higher than 1.063 for industries in the upper quartile. The median values of j and j are estimated at 1.053 and 1.050 respectively.
Within regime R = P C-M O in JP , b j is lower than 1.060 for industries in the …rst quartile and higher than 1.099 for industries in the third quartile. b j is lower than -0.514 for industries in the …rst quartile and higher than -0.340 for industries in the third quartile. The corresponding b j is lower than 1.010 for the …rst quartile of industries and higher than 1.062 for the top quartile. The corresponding b " N w j is estimated to be lower than 2.065 for industries in the …rst quartile and higher than 2.975 for industries in the upper quartile. Within regime R = IC-P R in N L, b j is lower than 0.995 for industries in the …rst quartile and higher than 1.048 for industries in the third quartile. b is lower than 1.306 for industries in the …rst quartile and higher than 1.390 for industries in the upper quartile. The median values of j and j are estimated at 1.027 and 1.357 respectively.
Within R = IC-EB in N L, b j is lower than 0.983 for industries in the …rst quartile and higher than 1.021 for industries in the third quartile. b j is lower than 0.406 for industries in the …rst quartile and higher than 0.693 for industries in the third quartile. The corresponding b j is lower than 1.331 for the …rst quartile of industries and higher than 1.470 for the top quartile. The corresponding b j is estimated to be lower than 0.267 for industries in the …rst quartile and higher than 0.294 for industries in the upper quartile. The median values of b j , b j b j and b j are estimated at 1.013, 0.465, 1.444 and 0.273 respectively.
Within R = IC-M O in N L, b j is lower than 1.023 for industries in the …rst quartile and higher than 1.064 for industries in the third quartile. b j is lower than -0.668 for industries in the …rst quartile and higher than -0.341 for industries in the third quartile. The corresponding b j is lower than 1. <Insert Table 4 
about here>
Summing up, we do not only observe important regime di¤erences across the three countries, we also …nd di¤erences in the levels of product and labor market imperfections and scale economies within a regime.
Within the IC-P R-regime in F R, JP and N L, the median scale elasticity estimates are comparable across the three countries while the median price-cost mark-up is estimated to be the highest in N L and the lowest in JP . Within the IC-EB-regime in F R and N L, the median scale elasticity and the median price-cost markup are estimated to be the highest in N L whilst the median absolute extent of rent sharing is estimated to be the highest in F R. Within the IC-M O-regime in F R and N L, the median scale elasticity and the median price-cost mark-up are estimated to be the highest in N L whilst the median labor supply elasticity is estimated to be the highest in F R.
Existing empirical studies -relying on either the same or a simpli…ed version of our theoretical modelhave found that product and labor market imperfections are likely to go hand in hand by documenting a positive correlation between the estimated price-cost mark-up and the estimated extent of rent sharing in the cross-section dimension (see Dobbelaere, 2004; Boulhol et al., 2011 and Dobbelaere and Mairesse, 2013) . Corroborative evidence is provided by several OECD studies indicating that (i) there is a positive correlation between product market regulation and industry wage mark-ups (OECD, 2001) and (ii) product and labor market deregulations are correlated across countries (e.g. Brandt et al., 2005) . Supporting evidence is also given by Ebell and Haefke (2006) who argue that the strong decline in coverage and unionization in the UK and the US might have been a direct consequence of product market reforms of the early 1980s and by Boulhol (2009) who develops a theoretical model formalizing the idea that trade and capital market liberalization put pressure on labor market institutions leading to deregulation. Do we observe any relationship between product and labor imperfections in the three countries under consideration? To get a …rst insight, Table B .7 in Appendix B reports correlations between product and labor market imperfection parameters for all industries and for the relevant predominant regimes in each of the three countries. Two types of correlations between b j and b j / b j and b j are reported: Spearman's rank correlation coe¢ cients and biweight midcorrelation coe¢ cients. The latter, which is based on Wilcox (2005) , gives a correlation that is less sensitive to outliers and therefore more robust. Considering all industries, we observe a signi…cant and strong correlation (of more than 0.75) between either b j and b j or b j and b j in F R. This holds for both types of correlation coe¢ cients. Within the predominant regimes in F R, we …nd a signi…cant correlation of about 0.65 between b j and b j in the IC-EB-regime. Considering all industries, we observe a signi…cantly positive rank (robust) correlation of 0.50 (0.16) between b j and b j and a signi…cantly negative rank correlation of -0.46 between b j and b j in JP . The latter correlation loses signi…cance in the P C-M O-regime. Considering all industries, we observe a signi…cantly positive correlation of about 0.73 between either b j and b j or b j and b j in N L. This is true for both types of correlation coe¢ cients. However, none of the correlation coe¢ cients are signi…cant within the predominant regimes. A visual representation is given in Graphs 1-3. Each graph corresponds to one country. The …rst two panels in each graph focus on all industries, whereas the last two panels in Graphs 1 and 3 and the last panel in Graph 2 focus on the predominant regimes. The dashed lines denote the median values of the product and labor market imperfection parameters.
<Insert 
Conclusion
How di¤erent are manufacturing industries in their factor shares, in their marginal products, in their scale economies and in their imperfections in the product and labor markets in which they operate? How does their behavior deviate across countries? In order to analyze these questions, we rely on an extension of Hall's (1988) econometric framework for estimating price-cost margins and scale economies by nesting three distinct labor market settings (perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining, e¢ cient bargaining and monopsony).
Using an unbalanced panel of 17,653 …rms over the period 1986-2001 in France, 8,725 …rms over the period 1994-2006 in Japan and 7,828 …rms over the period 1993-2008 in the Netherlands, we …rst apply two procedures to determine the prevalent product market and labor market settings, and hence the prevalent regime, in 30 comparable manufacturing industries. Irrespective of the classi…cation procedure, our analysis provides evidence of pronounced regime di¤erences across the three countries. The dominant regime in France is one of imperfect competition in the product market and e¢ cient bargaining in the labor market (IC-EB). The median pro…t ratio -de…ned as the price-cost mark-up divided by the scale elasticity-and absolute extent of rent-sharing parameters in the IC-EB-industries are of 1.41 and 0.41 respectively. In Japan, the dominant regime is perfect competition in the product market and perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining in the labor market (P C-P R), with a median pro…t ratio of about 1.00. The dominant regime in the Netherlands is one of imperfect competition in the product market and perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining in the labor market (IC-P R ), with a median pro…t ratio of about 1.39. Our study does not only highlight cross-country regime di¤erences, it also reveals cross-country di¤erences in the levels of product and labor market imperfections and scale economies within a particular regime. 
Appendix A : Technical details of the theoretical framework A.1 IC and perfectly comp. labor market/right-to-manage bargaining (IC-PR) IC and perfectly competitive labor market Let us start from the following speci…cation of the production function: (Eq. (1) in the main text). Firms operate under imperfect competition in the product market (IC) and act as price takers in the input markets. Assuming that material input and labor are variable input factors, short-run pro…t maximization implies the following two …rst-order conditions:
Eqs. (A.1) and (A.2) equal Eqs. (2) and (3) in the main text.
Inserting Eqs. (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3) in the production function and rearranging terms yields:
IC and right-to-manage (RTM) bargaining
Let us abstain from the assumption that labor is priced competitively. We assume that the workers and the …rm bargain over wages (w) but that the …rm retains the right to set employment (N ) unilaterally afterwards (right-to-manage bargaining; Nickell and Andrews, 1983 ). Since, as in the perfectly competitive labor market case, material input and labor are unilaterally determined by the …rm from pro…t maximization [see Eqs. (A.1) and (A.2) respectively], the mark-up of price over marginal cost ( ) that follows from Eq. (A.4) is not only consistent with the assumption that the labor market is perfectly competitive but also with the less restrictive right-to-manage bargaining assumption.
A.2 IC and e¢ cient bargaining (IC-EB)
Firms operate under imperfect competition in the product market (IC). On the labor side, we assume that the workers and the …rm bargain over wages (w) and employment (N ) (e¢ cient bargaining; McDonald and Solow, 1981) . It is the objective of the workers to maximize U (w it ; N it ) = N it w it + (N it N it )w it , where N it is the competitive employment level (0 < N it N it ) and w it w it the reservation wage. Consistent with capital quasi-…xity, it is the …rm's objective to maximize its short-run pro…t function:
where R it = P it Q it stands for total revenue. The outcome of the bargaining is the generalized Nash solution to: max wit; Nit; Mit
where it 2 [0; 1] represents the absolute extent of rent sharing.
Material input is unilaterally determined by the …rm from pro…t maximization, which directly leads to Eq. (A.1).
Maximization with respect to the wage rate and labor respectively gives the following …rst-order conditions: 
Using this expression together with Eq. (A.8) , the elasticity of output with respect to labor can be written as:
Given that we can rewrite Eq. (A. 6) as
Eq. (A.9) is equivalent to Eq. (4) in the main text:
A.3 IC and monopsony (IC-MO)
So far, we have assumed that there is a potentially in…nite supply of employees wanting a job in the …rm. A small wage cut by the employer will result in the immediate resignation of all existing workers. However, there are a number of reasons why labor supply might be less than perfectly elastic, creating rents to jobs. Paramount among these are the absence of perfect information on alternative possible jobs (Burdett and Mortensen, 1998), moving costs (Boal and Ransom, 1997) and heterogeneous worker preferences for job characteristics (Bhaskar and To, 1999; Bhaskar et al., 2002) on the supply side, and e¢ ciency wages with diseconomies of scale in monitoring (Boal and Ransom, 1997) and entry costs on the part of competing …rms on the demand side. All these factors give employers nonnegligible market power over their workers.
Consider a …rm that operates under imperfect competition in the product market (IC) and faces a labor supply N it (w it ), which is an increasing function of the wage w it . Both N it (w it ) and the inverse of this relationship w it (N it ) are referred to as the labor supply curve of the individual …rm. The monopsonist …rm's objective is to maximize its short-run pro…t function, taking the labor supply curve as given:
Maximization with respect to material input directly leads to Eq. (A.1).
Maximization with respect to labor gives the following …rst-order condition:
where it = (" N w )it 1+(" N w )it and (" N w ) it 2 < + represents the wage elasticity of the labor supply. Rewriting Eq. (A.12) gives the following expression for the elasticity of output with respect to labor (Eq. (5) in the main text):
Appendix B : Statistical annex
B.1 Measurement of the cost of capital in the Japanese data
The capital stock is constructed from tangible …xed assets. In the BSJBSA, tangible …xed assets include land that is reported at nominal book values except for 1995 and 1996. In other words, the information on land is available only in 1995 and 1996. To construct the capital stock, we …rst exclude land from tangible …xed assets, multiplying by (1 the land ratio):
where ( e B K ) it and (B K ) it are the book value of tangible …xed assets that excludes land and includes land respectively and { is the land ratio. Following , the land ratio is proxied by the industry-average ratio of land to tangible …xed assets in 1995 and 1996. 1 The book value of tangible assets (excluding land) is then converted to the current value of tangible assets (or nominal tangible assets). The conversion rate is constructed from the Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by Industry published by the Ministry of Finance. The value of nominal tangible assets is then de ‡ated by the investment goods de ‡ator:
where e K it denotes real tangible assets for …rm i in year t (2000 constant prices), t is the conversion rate 2 and (P I ) t is the investment goods de ‡ator, which is de…ned as industry-speci…c nominal investment ‡ows divided by industry-speci…c real investment ‡ows. The latter is obtained from the JIP 2009 database. The real value of tangible assets in the initial year is de…ned as the initial capital stock e K i , where equals 1994 or the …rst year that a …rm appears in the BSJBSA. The perpetual inventory method is then used to construct the real capital stock:
where K it is the capital stock for …rm i in year t, t the depreciation rate de…ned as the weighted average of various assets in an industry and I it investment. 3 t is obtained from the JIP 2009 database.
The cost of capital is the user cost of capital multiplied by the real capital stock. The user cost of capital is obtained from the JIP 2009 database and de…ned as the industry-speci…c nominal capital cost divided by the industry-speci…c real capital stock. Notes: First-step robust standard errors. Industry and time dummies are included but not reported. The set of instruments includes the lagged levels of n, m and k dated (t 2) and (t 3) in the …rst-di¤erenced equations and the lagged …rst-di¤erences of n, m and k dated (t 1) in the levels equations. Notes: a) NES 114: French industrial classification, "Nomenclature Economique de Synthèse -Niveau 3", b) BSJBSA: Basic Survey of Japanse Business Structure and Activities, c) SBI: Dutch industrial classification, "Standaard Bedrijfsindeling". 
Clothing and skin goods
Wooden products
Pulp, paper and paper products
Publishing, (re)printing
Ceramic, stone and clay products 
Household electrical appliances
Other electrical machinery Regime  =  - [10% of industries, 8% of firms] Notes: First-step robust standard errors in parentheses. Time dummies are included but not reported. The set of instruments includes the lagged levels of ,  and  dated ( − 2) and ( − 3) in the first-differenced equations and the lagged first-differences of ,  and  dated ( − 1) in the levels equations. Industries within  =  -  and  = -  are ranked according to    , industries within  =  - and  = - are ranked according to    and industries within  =  - and  = - are ranked according to    . 
